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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 5 e e , /ft^******-' 
1. Did t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission err in failing to include flkU-J 
* .v*~-ww^ .uw^uit on the award of workmen's compensation benefits made? 
2. Did t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission err in fixing Peti t ioners ' 
at torney's fees a t $200.00 without an opportunity for hearing? 
3. Did t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission err in failing to include 
Stephanie Bridgeforth as a dependent-beneficiary of the award? 
4. Did t h e Industr ia l Cormission err in failing to apportion a 
greater share of the benefits awarded to Petitioners? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 19, 1983 , whi le in t he course and scope of his 
employment with Acropo l i s Wholesale d/b/a Chris & Dick's, Pet i t ioners ' 
d eceden t , Larry Crenshaw, was fatally injured in a truck accident (Record 
Pages 1-3) . Decedent was the father of Petitioner Larry Gene Crenshaw, 
J r . , born June 9, 1983, and had acknowledged paternity of the child on June 
15 , 1983, by f i l i n g an Acknowledgement of Paternity with the Utah State 
Department of Health in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-12 (R, 
5a). 
At t h e t ime of h i s d e a t h , t h e decedent was residing with and 
supporting his son and the chi ld ' s mother, Petit ioner Stephanie Bridgeforth 
(R. 9 ) . Decedent had been r e s i d i n g with Stephanie Bridgeforth as her 
husband for approximately three years prior to his death (R. 34, 52)• They 
were engaged and had set a wedding date, which had once been postponed due 
t o i l l n e s s . During the i r relationship, Petitioner Stephanie Bridgeforth 
had remained a t home and cared for the decedent; she was dependent upon him 
for her suppor t (R. 5 2 ) . P r i o r t o h i s death, the decedent had naned 
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P e t i t i o n e r "S tephan ie Crenshaw, wife" as t h e benefic iary on a l i f e 
luring his l i fe (R. 63). In short, a t the time of his 
d e a t h , the decedent treated Stephanie Bridgeforth as his wife and supported 
her, and she saw to his needs. 
On March 22, 1984, P e t i t i o n e r s filed a Claim for Dependent's 
Benef i t s with the Respondent Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 3). Claims 
were also allegedly filed on behalf of Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Sanobi 
Maki Johnson, two o t h e r c h i l d r e n allegedly born to the decedent out of 
wedlock; however, s a i d c h i l d r e n a r e not part ies of th i s appeal, U^ jon 
rev iewing a l l c l a i m s , the Honorable Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law 
Judge for t h e Industrial Commission, found the claims of Petitioner Larry 
G. Crenshaw, J r . , and Kristen Crenshaw to be "valid claim" (R. 35), and 
den ied t h e claim of Petitioner Stephanie Bridgeforth on the basis that she 
was not a dependent of the decedent within the neaning of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 35-1-71 (R. 35), 
In her Order of February 15 , 1985, (included in the Addendum 
h e r e t o ) , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge conputed workmen's compensation 
b e n e f i t s and d i r e c t e d t h a t they be d i v i d e d equally between Larry G. 
Crenshaw, J r . , and Kristen Crenshaw, but failed to provide for any interest 
on t he b e n e f i t s awarded. The Judge fu r the r limited the Pet i t ioners ' 
a t t o r n e y ' s f ee s t o $200.00, t o be deducted from the award made to the 
decedent's son (R. 37). 
In an Amended Order, dated March 11, 1985, (also included in the 
Addendum), t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Juige corrected the award to Kristen 
Crenshaw t o t e r m i n a t e the payment of benefits to her as of July 6, 1989, 
when she w i l l reach age 18 (R. 46). Petitioners filed their Petition for 
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uo\/i.ew on March 26, 1985, seeking as relief that (a) the Order previously 
.„ .1 v(? ^ ^ ^ t o i n c i u c i e statutory interest on the award from the date 
u e n e l i t s were payable; (b) Peti t ioners ' attorneys be afforded a hearing to 
de te rmine a fair and equitable amount of attorney's fees; (c) the Order be 
re-opened for e n t r y of a f i nd ing and d e t e r m i n a t i o n that Petitioner 
S tephan ie Bridgeforth was, a t the time of decedent's death, a dependent of 
Larry Crenshaw and t h a t she be awarded workmen's condensation benefits 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-73; and (d) the Order be amended to 
award a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y greater and more equitable share of benefits to 
Petitioners (R. 49-62). 
On May 8, 1985, the Respondent Industrial Commission of Utah gave 
n o t i c e of i t s d e n i a l of P e t i t i o n e r s ' Motion for Review and affirmed, 
wi thou t comment, the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated March 3.1, 
1985 (R. 8 2 ) . The P e t i t i o n for Writ of Review to th is Honorable Court 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The I n d u s t r i a l Commission e r r e d in f a i l i n g to include 
s t a t u t o r y interest on the benefits awarded. The Utah Code clearly provides 
t h a t workmen's compensation awards shall include interest a t the rate of 8% 
per annum. The f a i l u r e t o award interest i s not only contrary to th is 
s t a t u o r y d i r e c t i v e , but results in a patent unfairness to Petitioners who 
w i l l wa i t s e v e r a l y e a r s before r e c e i v i n g the full amount of benefits 
awarded but wil l not receive interest . 
2. The Industiral Commission erred in not allowing Peti t ioners ' 
counse l a hearing on the amount of their fees incurred herein. The denial 
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of a hearing on the issue of fees deprived Petit ioners and their counsel of 
;o process right to a hearing, 
3, The I n d u s t r i a l Commission e r r e d i n f a i l i n g to include 
P e t i t i o n e r Stephanie Bridgeforth as a beneficiary of the benefits awarded. 
Under t h e f a c t s of th i s case, Petitioner Bridgeforth bore to the decedent 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p of wife, and was to ta l ly dependant upon him for support. 
Under r e l e v a n t s t a t u t e s and c a s e law, P e t i t i o n e r Bridgeforth was a 
dependent of the decedent and ent i t led to a ©hare of the benefits awarded. 
4. The I n d u s t r i a l Commission e r r e d in evenly dividing the 
b e n e f i t s awarded between Petitioner Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . , and Kristen 
Crenshaw. The decedent was l iv ing with his son at the time of his death 
and was f u l l y s u p p o r t i n g him. The decedent had not l ived with Kristen 
Crenshaw f o r many y e a r s p r i o r t o h i s d e a t h , and had only made token 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o her support. Accordingly, i t would have been more just 
and equitable to award Petit ioners a greater share of the benefits awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE 
STATUTORY INTEREST ON TOE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
AWARDED. 
Utah Code Ann. S e c t i o n 3 5 - 1 - 7 8 (1981 Supp.) provides that 
workmen's compensat ion awards made by the Industrial Commission shall 
i n c l u d e i n t e r e s t from the date benefits are otherwise due and payable at 
t h e rate of 8% per annum. The Commission's Order contains no provision for 
i n t e r e s t d e s p i t e the statutory direct ive . Since the Order of May 8f 1985 
i s t h e f inal "award" of the Commission as that term i s defined in Sections 
3 5 - 1 - 4 4 ( 7 ) and 3 5 - 1 - 8 2 . 5 2 , t h e Commission erred in fa i l ing to include 
i n t e r e s t . P e t i t i o n e r s were , front t h e date of their decedent's death, 
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s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t a t 8% per annum as part of the award. 
See Pacheco v. I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 668 P.2d 553 (Utah, 1983), The 
Commission's Order should be reversed and this matter remanded for entry of 
an award i n c l u d i n g s t a t u t o r y i n t e r e s t from the date of the decedent's 
death • 
Allegations by the Respondent Commission that interest should not 
be awarded where t h e r e i s no substantial delay in ini t ia t ing payment of 
b e n e f i t s and /o r where the S t a t e Fund reasonably moved ahead to effect 
se t t lement are inapposite in view of the plan statutory directive set forth 
in Sec t ion 35-1-78 . The Code p rov ides t h a t awards by the Respondent 
Commission s h a l l i n c l u d e i n t e r e s t ; the r u l e i s c l e a r and without 
e x c e p t i o n . The speed wi th which t h e Respondent Commission ini t iated 
payment of benef i t s or the Respondent Fund effected settlement i s plainly 
irrelevant to the award of interest . 
Moreover , a p a t e n t unfa i rness results to the beneficiaries of 
t h i s structured-settlement type award if no interest i s allowed. The total 
award in this case was $75,716.16 (R. 36). During the f i r s t year under the 
p r e s e n t Order , t he Respondent Fund will pay out only $11,648.64 of the 
t o t a l b e n e f i t s awarded (R. 3 6 ) . The Fund w i l l accordingly have the 
i n t e r e s t - f r e e use of approximate ly $64,000.00 during the f i r s t year 
b e n e f i t s a r e pa id and the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the award will lose 8% in 
i n t e r e s t on the benefits not paid. This results in a boon to the Fund and 
an u n f a i r l o s s t o P e t i t i o n e r s . In o rde r t h a t t h e r i g h t s of t h e 
benef ic iar ies of the award are fully protected and so that they receive the 
f u l l award nade to them, the Order of the Ccrrmission should be reversed and 
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t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s remanded for entry of an award including interest at 8% 
per annum, 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FIXING AND LIMITING 
PETITIONERS' ATTORNEY'S FEES WITHOUT A HEARING, 
Utah Code Ann. S e c t i o n 35-1-87 vests the Respondent Commission 
wi th power t o r e g u l a t e and f ix fees of attorneys representing applicants 
f o r b e n e f i t s . This power i s not u n b r i d l e d , however. In Thatcher v. 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 207 P.2d 178, 115 U. 568 (1949), th i s Court held 
t h a t as a matter ot due process ot law, attorneys are ent i t led to a hearing 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e amount of proper fee upon request, even after a fee has 
been f i x e d by t h e Commission. The due process hearing requirement i s to 
p r o t e c t a g a i n s t attorneys being limited to "such niggardly fees that they 
cannot af ford to accept conpensation cases. And particularly where i t has 
become necessary to carry a case to th i s Court should the Commission be at 
l east noderately l iberal in allowance of attorney's fees ." Id . , a t 182. 
Contrary t o t h i s Court's directive in Thatcher, the Respondent 
Commiss ion's award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s was both niggardly and overly 
f i s c a l l y conservative. The Administrative Law Judge found, with regard to 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees , that counsel for Petit ioners "put in minimal time on th i s 
p a r t i c u l a r f i l e . " (R. 36)• Said Finding has no evidentiary support in the 
r e c o r d , nor i s t h e r e any d a t a or evidence which was referred to by the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge to support her conclusion. Counsel proceeded as 
t h e y did in th i s matter in order that a l l protential claimants might assert 
t h e i r c l a i m s and t h e record might include a l l data necessary to make a 
proper award. Moreover, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge fai led to take 
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cognizance of t he f a c t and inquire into Peti t ioners ' counsel's services 
which did not appear " in the f i l e " , such as time spent interviewing 
P e t i t i o n e r Br idgefor th and potential witnesses, requesting and reviewing 
a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s , researching issues and acquainting themselves with the 
n a t u r e of the case, e tc . Instead, the Administrative Law Judge based her 
f i nd ing s t r i c t l y on her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the appearance of the f i l e , 
wi thou t a l lowing counse l an o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard as required by 
Thatcher. 
Nor i s there any indication in the record that the Administrative 
Law Judge considered any oC the factors which th is Court has enumerated as 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e of a reasonable fee. In Thatcher, supra, th is Court held 
that ; 
( i ) n determining the amount of the fee, i t i s proper to consider 
(1) t h e t ime and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of 
t h e q u e s t i o n s involved and the s k i l l requis i te properly to 
conduct the cause ; (2) whether the acceptance of exployment in 
t h e p a r t i c u l a r case w i l l preclude the lawyer's appearance for 
o t h e r s in cases l i k e l y to arise out of the transaction, and in 
which t h e r e i s a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would 
be employed, or will involve the loss of their employment while 
employed in the p a r t i c u l a r case or antagonisms with other 
c l i e n t s ; (3) t he customary charges of t he Bar for similar 
s e r v i c e s ; (4) the amount involved in the controversy and for the 
b e n e f i t s r e s u l t i n g t o t he c l i e n t from t h e services (5) the 
cont ingency or the uncertainty of the condensation; and (6) the 
charac te r of the employment, whether casual or for an established 
and constant cl ient ; 
207 P.2d a t 183. 
N o t h i n g t h e Order of February 15th i n d i c a t e s t h a t t he 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge cons ide red any of these factors in setting 
counse l ' s fee in th is case. Further, the record fa i l s to disclose that the 
A m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge or the Respondent Commission considered these 
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f a c t o r s in d e c i d i n g P e t i t i o n e r s ' Motion for Review, In Thatcher, th is 
Court held that: 
(e)conomy of t ime and e f f o r t t o a l l concerned in those cases 
makes i t p r a c t i c a l for t h e commission to fix a fee from i t s 
e x p e r i e n c e in compensation cases without hearing as to the value 
of t he s e r v i c e s performed. But i f t h e a t t o r n e y s or t h e 
a p p l i c a n t ask for a hearing on the matter either before the fee 
i s f ixed or fo r a r e h e a r i n g a f t e r t h e fee i s fixed on the 
amount of t h e fee allowed, the sane should be granted in order 
to satisfy the requirements of due process. 
I d . , a t 183. Since n e i t h e r P e t i t i o n e r s nor t h e i r counsel were ever 
a l lowed a h e a r i n g on t h e amount of a t t o r n e y ' s fees, the Order of the 
Respondent Comission i s void in th is respect as a matter of due process. 
The a t t o r n e y ' s fee award heretofore made should be set aside and these 
proceedings remanded for a hearing on the amount of attorney's fees. 
C. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING BENEFITS 
TO PETITIONER STEPHANIE BRIDGEFORTH. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-71 provides that: 
No person s h a l l be considered as a dependent (for purposes 
of an award of workmen's condensation benefits) unless he 
or she i s a member of the family of the deceased employee, 
or bears a relationship of husband or wife, l ineal decedent, 
ancestor or brother or s i s t e r . 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge held t h a t s i n c e P e t i t i o n e r Stephanie 
B r i d g e f o r t h d id "not seem to f i t within any of these categories/ ' she was 
not e n t i t l e d t o a p o r t i o n of the benefits awarded (R. 35). However, in 
l i g h t o t t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t he Judge 's ruling, affirmed by the 
Commission (R. 82), resul ts in a patent unfairness to Petitioner and i s in 
error. 
At t h e t ime of h i s d e a t h , the decedent had been living with 
P e t i t i o n e r Stephanie Bridgeforth as her husband for three years, although 
they had not participated in a formal marriage ceremony. They were engaged 
and had s e t a wedding date, which had once been postponed due to i l lness . 
(R. 5 2 ) . During the course of their relationship, Petitioner Bridgeforth 
had remained at home and cared for the decedent and she was dependent upon 
him for her support. Four months before the decedent's death, Petitioner 
gave b i r t h t o the decedent's son, Petitioner Larry Crenshaw, J r . , and the 
decedent was named as the father on the chi ld ' s birth cer t i f icate (R. 31). 
Decedent a l s o acknowledged p a t e r n i t y of t he c h i l d pursuant to Utah 
s t a t u t e s . (R. 5a). The decedent had also named "Stephanie Crenshaw, wife" 
as t h e beneficiary of a l i fe insurance policy insuring his l i fe (R. 63-64). 
At t h e time of his death, the decedent treated Stephanie Bridgeforth as his 
wife and supported her, and she saw to his needs. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec t ion 35-1-71 provides that "the question of 
dependency, in whole or in part , shall be determined in accordance with the 
f a c t s in each p a r t i c u l a r case existing a t the time of the.. .death of an 
e m p l o y e e . . . " Desp i t e the facts enumerated above, the Administrative Law 
Judge concluded t h a t P e t i t i o n e r Bridgeforth was not a dependent of the 
deceden t . However, a t the time of his death Petitioner Bridgeforth was a 
member of the decedent's family and they bore to each other (in fact if not 
in law) t h e "relat ionship" of husband and wife for three years before the 
d e c e d e n t ' s dea th . Petitioner Bridgeforth was dependent upon the decedent 
for her s u p p o r t . She had remained a t home and cared for the decedent and 
a f t e r g i v i n g b i r t h to his son, she took care of both of them. Petitioner 
B r i d g e f o r t h and t h e decedent were engaged and had just postponed their 
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marriage due to i l lness . Their relationship was that of a husband and wife 
who simply had not participated in a more formal marriage ceremony. Indeed, 
t h e belief of the part ies that they bore to one another the relationship of 
husband and wife prompted the decedent to name "Stephanie Crenshaw, wife/ ' 
as the beneficiary of a l i fe insurance policy on his l i f e . 
In l i g h t of t h e f a c t s of th is case, Stephanie Bridgeforth i s a 
surviving "dependent" of the decedent within the meaning of Utah Code. She 
was a member of the decedent's family in the truest sense of the word, was 
dependent upon t h e deceden t for her s u p p o r t , and bore t o him the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of w i f e . Moreover, while the legislature created a wholly 
dependent presumpt ion in favor of " s u r v i v i n g wife or husband", i t 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y used different language in setting forth the factors to be 
cons ide red in a l l o t h e r c a se s where dependent status i s in question. 
Sec t ion 35-1-71 p r o v i d e s t h a t in o rde r for one t o be considered as 
dependen t , he or she must "bear t he relation of husband or wife" to a 
deceased employee. This " re la t ionsh ip" language i s in addition to and 
d i f f e r e n t from the "surviving husband or wife" language which gives r i se to 
t h e au tomat i c presumpt ion of dependency. This l a t t e r provision would 
appear t o bring within the purview of the statutory dependency requirement 
pe r sons such as Petitioner Bridgeforth, who may not have participated in a 
formal marriage ceremony, but who cared for a deceased employee, gave birth 
t o h i s c h i l d r e n , was designated as the wife-beneficiary of an insurance 
p o l i c y on t h e d e c e d e n t ' s l i f e , and bore to the deceased enployee the 
relationship of wife. 
Sec t ion 35-71-1 r e q u i r e s t h a t a survivor bear to a deceased 
employee t h e r e l a t i o n of husband or w i f e . I t does not require the 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p t o be " l e g a l " or "lawful" in the sense that a minister or 
judge presided over a formal ceremony. Indeed, 
(w)hen the dependency statute has uti l ized terms.. . such as 
•member of deceased's family' or 'member of his household,' 
t h e c o u r t s have fe l t more free to adopt a obstruct ion that 
w i l l extend p r o t e c t i o n t o the people who need i t and who 
were t h e r e f o r e presumably w i th in t he intention of the 
framers of the s t a t u t e . The concept of member of the 
d e c e a s e d ' s family has o f ten held to go beyond immediate 
relatives by blood or marriage. 
L a r s o n ' s Workmen's Compensation Desk E d i t i o n , Vol . 2, April, 1984; 
Sect ion 62.33. Petitioner Bridgeforth was, upon the death of the decedent, 
in need of the protections afforded by the workmen's compensation s tatutes , 
and by d e c l a r i n g t h a t a person who bea r s to a deceased employee "the 
r e l a t i o n of husband or wife" may qualify as a dependent, the legislature 
undoubtedly in tended t o i nc lude persons such as Petitioner within the 
protection of the law. 
F u r t h e r , t h e f a c t t h a t the decedent financially contributed to 
t h e suppor t of Stephanie Bridgeforth i s c r i t i c a l to a proper determination 
of her s t a t u s as a dependent . In Utah Galena Corp. v . Industrial 
Commission, 5 P.2d 242, 78 U. 495 (Utah, 1931), th is Court cited with 
approva l a u t h o r i t y which held that dependency, for workmen's compensation 
pu rpose s , does not mean only absolute dependency for the necessities of 
l i f e , but a l s o includes persons who look to and rely on the contributions 
of t h e worker, in whole or in part , as a means of supporting or maintaining 
himself accord ing t o h i s s o c i a l posi t ion and accustomed mode of l i f e . 
F u r t h e r , in Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co, v. Industrial Comiission, 36 
P.2d 979, 984, 84 U. 481, 488, (Utah, 1934), this Court held that: 
A dependent i s one who looks for another for support, and 
t h e t r u e c r i t e r i o n i s whether one has a r ea sonab le 
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e x p e c t a t i o n of c o n t i n u i n g or future support - to receive 
such c o n t r i b u t i o n s as are necessary and needed to maintain 
him in his accustomed station of l i f e . 
Also see Bradshaw v. I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 135 P. 2d 530, 103 U. 405 
(1943) (dependency de termined in terms of financial support); Roller 
Coas te r Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 189 P.2d 709, 112 U. 532 (1948) 
( p a r t i a l dependency predicated on son's contributions of cash, groceries 
and care of a garden which produced food for the family). 
More r e c e n t l y , in Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200 
(1984) , t h i s Court he ld t h a t a common-law wife may be considered a 
dependent e n t i t l e d to survivor workmen's compensation benefits. In Tuom, 
t h e p l a i n t i f f "became marr ied (to the deceased worker) in a common law 
r e l a t i o n s h i p in I d a h o . " I d . , a t 1201. While she was not presumed 
t o t a l l y dependent on the worker because she was not living with him at the 
t ime of d e a t h , t h i s Court held that a coimon-law wife may be enti t led to 
dependent status based upon the facts of her case, including the extent and 
amount of support she actually received from her "husband." 
The r u l i n g in Tuom i s significant for two reasons: f i r s t , th is 
Court recognized that a comron-law wife, one who had not participated in a 
ceremony as provided by s ta tu te , may qualify as a dependent for workmen's 
compensation purposes; and second, where there i s no presumption of to ta l 
dependency, the question of dependency i s to be determined according to the 
f a c t s of t h e c a s e . In t h i s c a s e , P e t i t i o n e r Bridgeforth bore to the 
deceden t the relationship of wife; indeed, she was, in a sense, decedent's 
common-law w i f e , as they had not participated in a cerraony as provided by 
s t a t u t e . Further, under the facts of th is case, Petitioner Bridgeforth was 
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w h o l l y dependent upon the decedent for her support. Accordingly, a finding 
t h a t P e t i t i o n e r Bridgeforth was dependent upon the decedent a t the time of 
h i s d e a t h was p r o p e r , and s h e was e n t i t l e d t o receive a share of the 
workmen ' s compensation benef i ts awarded. The Indus t r i a l Commission erred 
i n determining tha t Pe t i t i one r Bridgeforth was not a surviving dependent of 
L a r r y G. Crenshaw, and i t s r u l i n g s h o u l d be s e t aside and t h i s case 
remanded for entry of an appropriate order . 
D. THE EQUAL DIVISION OF BENEFITS BETWEEN PETITIONER LARRY 
CRENSHAW, J R . , AND KRISTEN DANIELLE CRENSHAW WAS NOT A 
JUST AND EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT UNDER TOE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-73 provides t ha t M(t)he benef i ts in 
c a s e of d e a t h s h a l l be paid t o such one or more of the dependents of the 
d e c e d e n t . . . as nay be determined by the comnission, which nay apportion the 
b e n e f i t s among t h e d e p e n d e n t s i n such manner a s i t deems ju s t and 
e q u i t a b l e . " The equal d iv is ion of workmen's condensation benefi ts awarded 
by t h e Commission between Kristen Crenshaw and Larry Crenshaw, J r . , was not 
u n d e r t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , " jus t and e q u i t a b l e / ' and the said Order 
should therefore be amended. 
As i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , a t the time of h i s death, the decedent was 
r e s i d i n g with Pe t i t ione r Stephanie Bridgeforth and they bore t o each other 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of husband and wife. Also pa r t of the family was the 
d e c e d e n t ' s son P e t i t i o n L a r r y G. Crenshaw, J r . , age four (4) months. 
D e c e d e n t w a s , a t t h e time of h i s death, the sole means of support of the 
Pe t i t i one r s • 
The d e c e d e n t was not l iv ing with Kristen Danielle Crenshaw, who 
was 12 y e a r s o l d a t t h e t i m e of h i s death, or her mother. There i s no 
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evidence in the record indicating that the decedent ever lived with Kristen 
or her mother; however, as counsel have proffered above, for the las t three 
y e a r s in h i s l i f e , t h e decedent was l i v i n g with the Petitioners as a 
family, and he was their sole means of support. 
As t h e record indicates the decedent paid only token support for 
K r i s t e n be fo re h i s death (R. 29-30). There i s no evidence in the record 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t he decedent provided any other support for Kristen than 
t h e s p o r a d i c monthly $50.00 payment he had agreed to pay pursuant to the 
Office of Recovery Services Consent Decree. 
Thus, t he evidence before the Commission was that a t the time of 
h i s d e a t h , t h e decedent had been paying only nominal support for Kristen 
D a n i e l l e Crenshaw, wi thou t any degree of regularity. At the same time, 
hwoever, t h e was t h e s o l e means of support for Petit ioners Stephanie 
B r i d g e f o r t h and Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . , and had resided with them as a 
family continuously the las t three years of his l i f e . 
Under these circumstances, an equal division of the award between 
K r i s t e n and L a r r y , J r . , i s unjust and inquitable. The decedent was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t i n g to the support of 12-year-old Kristen at the 
t ime of h i s d e a t h . Indeed, her public assistance grant would remain the 
same regardless of the payments made by the decedent. There i s no evidence 
t h e decedent had ever lived with Kristen or her mother prior to death. On 
t h e o t h e r hand, the decedent was the sole means of support for his infant 
son and P e t i t i o n e r Stephanie Bridgeforth. He had resided with them as a 
family for the las t three years of his l i f e . Under the circumstances, the 
dea th of Larry Crenshaw had a more severe impact upon the Petit ioners 
j u s t i f y i n g an a\*ard of a greater share of the benefits to them. With the 
d e c e d e n t ' s dea th , the Petitioners lost their sole means of support. They 
l o s t their husband and father with whom they had continuously resided unt i l 
h i s unt imely death, and with whom they expected to live as a family after 
October 19, 1983. On the other hand, there i s no evidence in the record of 
any s i g n i f i c a n t a c t u a l relationship between Kristen and Lary Crenshaw at 
t h e t ime of h i s death. An equal division of benefits i s not equitable or 
j u s t under the facts of th is case, and the Commission's Order should be set 
a s i d e and t h e s e p roceed ings remanded for d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a more 
appropriate division of benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Pe t i t ione r s respectfully request that th is Honorable 
Court order relief as follows: 
1. That the Finding and Order of the Coamission that Petitioner 
S tephanie B r idge fo r th i s not a dependent of t h e decedent, Larry G. 
Crenshaw, and i s t h e r e f o r e not e n t i t l e d t o a share of the workmen's 
compensation b e n e f i t s awarded in t h i s matter, be set aside and these 
p reoceed ings be remanded and the Commission directed to enter a finding 
t h a t P e t i t i o n e r Bridgeforth vias a dependent of the decdent and that she be 
awarded a share of the benefits. 
2. That t h e Order of the Coamission that the benefits awarded 
be equally divided between Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . , and Kristen Crenshaw, be 
s e t a s i d e and these proceedings be remanded for a determination of a more 
just and equitable division of benefits. 
3. That t h e s e p roceed ings be remanded and the Comission 
d i r e c t e d t o award interest on the workmen's compensation benefits awarded 
to Peti t ioners. 
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4. That these proceedings be renanded and a hearing held before 
the Commission for determination of the amount of Petitioners' attorney's 
fees. 
5. That Petitioners be awarded their attorney/s fees and costs 
incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this of July, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GALLBGOS & GCIUMBMD 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
On November 2, 1983, the State Insurance Fund, the insurance carrier 
for workmen9s compensation for Acropolis Wholesale, advised the Industrial 
Commission that as a result of its investigation, it was accepting liability 
in this matter and admitting the following facts with respect to the 
industrial accident in which Larry Crenshaw sustained fatal injuries on 
October 19, 1983: 
1. That the **3i?iJ2!, Larry CronsUw, was fatally injured in a 
truck accident on October 19, 1983 while in the course and scope 
of his employment with Acropolis Wholesale* 
2. That at the time of his death, the applicant was not 
married, but had three different children, all born out of 
wedlock. The first child, Kristen Danielle Crenshaw, was born 
on July 6, 1971. She is the daughter of Debra Leggrone. The 
applicant made periodic support payments to the mother in this 
matter. The last date of payment was September of 1982. The 
second child is Sanobi Malci Johnson. She was born on August 11, 
1972. The decedent did support this child very sporatically. 
He would occasionally buy the child a bike or some other toys 
and occasionally give the mother some money for the support of 
that child. Since that time, the mother of the child has 
remarried and the child was formally adopted by Kenneth Ray 
Johnson, the child1s stepfather, on December 28, 1979. No 
formal support was received after that time. The third child, 
Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr., was born on June 9, 1983 and is the 
son of Stephanie Elena Bridgeforth. The decedent was living 
with the mother of the third child at the time of his accident 
and providing support for that child. 
LARRY CRENSHAW 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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3* That the deceased, at the time of his death, had been 
working for the defendants for 16.43 weeks and had earned a 
total of $5,740.09 at the time of his death. This would mean 
that the applicant's average weekly wage was $349.37. His 
compensation rate would thus be $230.68 plus $10.00 for 
dependance allowance or a total of $240.68 per week. The total 
compensation to be paid in this matter would be $75,716.16. 
On August 18, 1984, the Commission received a claim for dependent's 
benefits on behalf of Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr. and Stephanie Bridgeforth, his 
mother. Claims on behalf of Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Sanobi Maki Johnson 
were filed on approximately the same <iate. In reviewing the claims in this 
matter, the Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that the claims for 
compensation to Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr. are 
valid claims. With regard to the claim of Sanobi Haki Johnson, the 
Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that she does not meet the criteria 
set forth in Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated as a dependent child of the 
deceased. That Section defines a dependant child as follows: 
(1) Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, 
if physically or mentally incapacited and dependant upon the 
parent, with whom they are living at the time of death of such 
parent, or who is legally bound for their support. 
At the time of the decedent's accident, he was not legally bound to 
support Sanobi Maki Johnson nor in fact was she living with him. She had been 
adopted formally in 1979 and had had relatively little contact with the 
decedent. 
Counsel for Stephanie Bridgeforth and her son Larry Gene Crenshaw, 
Jr., has urged that Stephanie Bridgeforth be viewed as a dependent of the 
applicant in this matter. In September of 1984, the Administrative Law Judge 
requested that counsel for Ms. Bridgeforth provide a written memorandum 
detailing in full her dependant status as well*as a petition for attorney's 
fees. This material was to be submitted to the Administrative Law Judge by 
October 15, 1984. Those materials have not been received. In addition the 
Administrative Law Judge has been informed that Stephanie Bridgeforth has 
married and is now known as Stephanie Roberts. Based on the facts contained 
in the file, the Administrative Law Judge sees no reason to view Stephanie 
Bridgeforth as a dependant of the deceased. Section 35-1-71, Utah Code 
Annotated, outlines as follows: 
No person shall be considered as a dependant unless he or she is 
a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears a 
relationship of husband or wife, lineal decedent, ancestor, or 
brother or sister. 
Ms. Bridgeforth does not seem to fit within any 3f these categories and, 
hence, is not entitled to a portion of compensation for herself. Accordingly, 
the workmen's compensation benefits in this matter should be split between 
Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr., who meet the 
requirements of the statute. 
LARRY CRENSHAW 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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With regards to attorney1s fees, the Administrative Law Judge is of 
the opinion that the attorney representing Stephanie Bridgeforth and Larry 
Gene Crenshaw, Jr. has put in minimal time on this particular file. No 
memorandum was ever submitted as requested by the Administrative Law Judge, or 
has further communications been had from that attorney. It is the opinion of 
the Administrative Law Judge that a fee of $200.00 is more than adequate 
compensation for the time that attorney has spent on this matter. That amount 
of $200.00 should come from the award made to Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Pursuant to the aforementioned discussion and Sections 35-1-68, 
35-1-73, and 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, the aforesaid dependants of the 
deceased, Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr., are entitled 
to the benefits herein provided, with the amounts awarded herein for those 
dependants to be deposited in the Utah State Employee's Credit Union in share 
accounts until they have reached their respective majorities. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Acropolis Wholesale 
and/or State Insurance Fund, pay $75,716.16 to the Utah State Employee9s 
Credit Union, said amount to be divided equally in amounts of $37,858.08 for 
deposit in share accounts naming Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Larry Gene 
Crenshaw, Jr., as owners of said accounts, subject to disbursement upon the 
written authorization of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The amount herein 
before awarded will be paid in weekly compensation payments of $121.34 to each 
of the accounts at intervals of not less than every four weeks until the total 
amounts of $37,858.08 has been paid into the separate accounts or a total of 
$75,716.16 has been paid. Accrued amounts shall be payable in a lump sum. 
Pertinent account information is as* follows: 
Name: Kristen Danielle Crenshaw 
DOB: 7/6/71 
Rate of payment 4 week intervals: $485.36 
Total payment: $37,858.08 
Account number: 50-74463-0 
Name: Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr. 
DOB: 6/9/83 
Rate of payment 4 week intervals: $485.36 
Total payment: $37,858.08 
Account number: 50-74464-8 
Until further notice, quarterly statements shall be mailed to Kristen 
Danielle Crenshaw, c/o Deborah Leggrone, her acting guardian, 1165 Chesterdale 
LARRY CRENSHAW 
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M, Cincinnatti, Ohio 45246. Statements should also be sent to Larry Gene 
Crenshaw, Jr., c/o Stephanie Bridgeforth Roberts, his acting guardian, at 31B 
Orchard Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, Sumpter, North Carolina 29152. Ms. 
Leggrone and Ms. Bridgeforth Roberts should make immediate application for 
social security numbers on behalf of Kristen and Larry and furnish said Credit 
Union with these numbers as soon as possible so as to facilitate the reporting 
of interest income. The Credit Union9s address is P.O. Box 45001, SLC, Ut. 
84145. Any changes of address should be made immediately available to both 
the Utah State Employee9s Credit Union and to the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Workers9 Compensation Division, P.O. Box 45580, SLC, Ut. 84145-0580. At 
the expiration of these benefits, Ms. Leggrone and Ms. Bridgeforth Roberts 
should contact the Industrial Commission concerning possible further benefits 
pursuant to Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Acropolis Wholesale and/or State Insurance 
Fund pay all medical and hospital bills resulting from the injury in addition 
to the statutory funeral allowance. All medical and hospital bills should be 
paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of this 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Acropolis Wholesale and/or 
Stale Insurance Fund, pay Joseph H. Gallegos, attorney for Stephanie 
Bridgeforth Roberts and Larry Crenshaw, Jr., the amount of $2000.00 said 
amount is to be deducted from the award made to Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
net L. Moffitt I A/) 
Administrative Law Ju 
Passed by the Industrial Commission bf^utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this /^^day of February, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
^Linda J. S^pasburg, CommissiojK Secretary 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000267 
* 
* 
KRISTEN D. CRENSHAW, SANOBI MAKX * 
JOHNSON, and LARRY G. CRENSHAW, * 
JR., minor children of LARRY * 
CRENSHAW, deceased * 






ACROPOLIS WHOLESALE and/or * 





* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On February 15, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order in 
this matter, awarding dependent benefit payments to Kristen D. Crenshaw and 
Larry G. Crenshaw minor children of Larry Crenshaw, the deceased in this 
matter. 
On February 27, 1985, the defendants filed a Motion for Review 
indicating that the Administrative Law Judge had erred in awarding Christen D. 
Crenshaw benefits beyond the date of July 6, 1989, inasmuch as she will turn 
eighteen on that date. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that this is 
an appropriate correction which should be made. This would mean that after 
that date the additional money should go into the account of Larry G. 
Crenshaw. This would mean that Kristen D. Crenshaw9s award would be reduced 
by $1,681.43 leaving her with a total award of $36,176.65. 
With regard to the other point raised by the defendants concerning 
payments to Larry G. Crenshaw after the date of October 11, 1989, the 
Administrative Law Judge notes that the points made by the defendants are 
accurate. However, it is speculative at this time as to whether Larry G. 
Crenshaw, Jr. will still be entitled to benefits after that six year period. 
Certainly, such information as is contained in Section 35-1-68 (2bii) should 
be made known to Mr. Crenshaw1 s guardians at the time he applies for 
additional benefits. 
In addition, to clarify the record in this matter, the Administrative 
Law Judge notes that counsel for Stephannie Bridgeforth Roberts contacted the 
Administrative Law Judge on February 28, 1985 and requested an extension to 
file a Motion for Review concerning Ms. Roberts dependent status. The 
Administrative Law Judge granted this extension of time to April 1, 1985. 




IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that paragraph one of the Order of February 
15, 1985 be amended as follows: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Acropolis Wholesale 
and/or State Insurance Fund, pay $75,716.16 to the Utah State 
Employee's Credit Union, said amount to be divided as an award of 
$36,176.65 to Kristen D. Crenshaw and $38,858.08 to Larry G. Crenshaw 
for deposit in share accounts naming Kristen D. Crenshaw and Larry G. 
Crenshaw, Jr., as owners of said accounts subject to disbursement of 
the written authorization of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The 
amounts herein before awarded will be paid in weekly compensation 
payments of $121.34 to each of the accounts at intervals of not less 
than every four weeks until the date of July 6, 1989. At that time, 
the payment to Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr. will be increased to $242.68 
per week until the date of October 11 • 1989 or until a total of 
$75,716.16 has been paid into the combined accounts. All accrued 
amounts shall be payable in e lump sum. 
Pertinent account information is as follows: 
NAME; Kristen D, Crenshaw 
DOB: 7/6/71 
Rate of Payment/4 Week Intervals: $485.36 
Total Payment: $36,176.65 
Account No. 50-74463-0 
NAME: Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr. 
DOB: 6/9/83 
Rate of Payment/4 Week Intervals: $485.36 until the date of 
July 6, 1989. Thereafter, $970.72 until October 11, 1989 
Total Payment: $38,858.08 
Account No. 50-74464-8 
Until further notice, quarterly statements should be mailed to 
Kristen D. Crenshaw, c/o Debra Leggrone, her acting guardian, at 1165 
sent to Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr., c/o Stephannie Bridgeforth Roberts, 
his acting guardian, at 31B Orchard Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, 
Sumpter, No. Carolina 29152. Ms. Leggrone and Ms. Bridgeforth 
Roberts should make immediate application for social security numbers 
on behalf of Kristen and Larry and furnish said Credit Union with 
these numbers as soon as possible so as to facilitate the reporting 
of interest income. The Credit Union1s address is P.O. Box 45001, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. Any changes of address should be made 





and to the Industrial Commission of Utah, P.O. Box 45580, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145. At the expiration of these benefits, Ms. 
Bridgeforth Roberts should contact the Industrial Commission 
concerning possible further benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-68, 
Utah Code Annotated, for the benefit of Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other provisions of the Order of 
February 15, 1985 and the amended Order of February 19, 1985, remain in full 
force and effect. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
^M/K<f'{&/ 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utih 
Salt Lake City, Utah, t h i s / ^ d a v o f W f c h , 1985. 
ATTEST: 
L. Moffitt 
strative Law Jud 
on 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I , t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , hereby ce r t i f y t ha t I personally served or 
m a i l e d f o u r (4) t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p i e s of t h e f o r e g o i n g BRIEF OF 
PETITIONERS, postage prepaid on t h i s of Ju ly , 1985, to Dennis V. 
L l o y d , Esq. , Utah S ta te Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, Sa l t Lake Ci ty , 
Utah 84111 ; The I n d u s t r i a l Commissin of Utah, 160 South 300 East, Post 
O f f i c e Box 5800 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110-5800; and Ralph Finlayson, 
E s q . , A s s i s t a n t Utah At to rney General, 236 Sta te Capitol Building, Sal t 
Lake Ci ty , Utah 84114. / 
CR#2A 
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